Mixed-Motive Defense Is A Complete Bar To Liability Under Section 1981 As To Retaliation Claims But Not Discrimination Claims
Metoyer sued the employer, asserting (among other things) race discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 USC Section 1981. A primary issue on appeal was whether the "mixed-motive" defense was a complete defense to liability on those claims. The 9th Circuit held that the mixed-motive defense is a complete bar to liability under Section 1981 as to retaliation claims, but not as to discrimination claims. The court acknowledged that its conclusion was at odds with that set forth by the 11th Circuit in Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union No. 1996, 176 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir 1999). Mabra held that the mixed-motive defense provides a complete bar to liability against all claims under Section 1981.
The court noted that Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz. Inc., 374 F.3d 840 (9th Cir 2004) "re-confirmed the pre-Price Waterhouse determination that an '[a]nalysis of an employment discrimination claim under Section 1981 follows the same legal principles as those applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case.'" The court reasoned "at the very least our holding in Fonseca incorporated the amended Title VII into the Section 1981 analysis such that the mixed-motive defense to liability is no longer available [as to discrimination claims] under Section 1981."
In Stegall v. Citadell Broadcasting Company, 350 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir 2004), the 9th Circuit applied the mixed-motive analysis as a complete defense to liability on a Title VII retaliation claim. Relying again on the rationale set forth in Fonseca, the court concluded that the mixed-motive defense does provide a complete bar to liability on Section 1981 retaliation claims.
42 USC Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to limit the reach of the mixed-motive defense. That section reduced the mixed-motive defense to a defense only to damages (rather than liability in total) as to discrimination claims brought under "Section 2000e-2(m) of this title." The DISSENT argued that "[i]n effect, the majority opinion amends Section 200e-5(g)(2)(B) to make its limitations on the mixed-motive defense applicable to actions brought 'under section 2000e-2(m) or section 1981 of this title.'" The dissent opined that the majority's decision created an inter-circuit split and constituted legislation from the bench.
Metoyer v. Screen Actors Guild
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction includes California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Alaska and Hawaii.
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